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Introduction
     This paper focuses on the issues of consumers
behaving as investors in the context of electronic
commerce. The notion of consumers as investors carries a
significance in that it is probably a part  of the web
surfing ecommerce consumers that have turned out to be
savvy (at least for now), active day traders (individual
investors) that are largely  responsible for the incredible
(fundamentals defying) stock prices of pure Internet
companies. Pure Internet companies are defined as those
companies that solely depend upon the Internet for their
revenue and do not have parent companies such as IBM,
Microsoft etc. to subsidize their financial resources.
Yahoo, Amazon.com, eBay etc. are prime examples. This
paper is one of the earliest attempts (according authors'
knowledge) at developing a theoretical model to explain
the incredible stock performance of Internet companies.
The Research Issue
     Nonetheless, the critical question remains:  given that
most of the Internet companies have turned nothing but
loss since their Initial Public Offering (IPO) date, why
have individual investors invested enormous capital that
cannot be justified by the available business performance
data from most of these companies. The purpose of this
paper is to develop a theoretical model based on the
literature on microfoundations of behavioral finance
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1995; Griffin and Tversky, 1992;
Einhorn 1980;Odean 1998; Greenwald, 1980;Svenson,
1981; Cooper et al. 1988; Taylor and Brown 1988; Keim,
1983)  to develop some insight into this incredible stock
market phenomenon.
Fundamentals of Internet Stocks and the Pure
Internet Companies in the Internet Industry
     The stocks of Internet companies have skyrocketed as
more and more investors continually invested in these
companies ignoring the basic fundamentals such as
relative youth of the companies, net income (loss) and
huge market capitalization, negative cash flow, etc.
Investors are investing in these companies with the
expectation that future cash flows will provide a
significant return on their investments. Table 1 shows
only a sample of these Internet companies and except for
eBay all of them have shown nothing but loss since the
date of their initial public offering. But the market
capitalization of these companies defy any logical
explanation that can be offered based on fundamentals of
business performance.
Table 1: Sample Internet Companies and their Net Income (Loss) and Market Cap.
Company
Name
Date of IPO Net
Income
Net Income as of Feb,
1999
Market
Capitalization , Feb 99
Lycos April 1, 96 -$1.3 M -$14.7 $3.75 B
Yahoo April 12, 96 -$0.6 M -$25.5 M $ 29.9 B
Excite April 3, 96 -$3.3 M -$37 M $5.74 B
Amazon.co may 15, 97 -$8.5 M -$78.1 M $19 B
Geocities Aug 10, 98 -$12.6 M -$11.3 M $3.05 B
eBay Sept. 24, 98 $0.6M $878,000 $15.8 B
     In this paper, we intend to develop a theoretical model
that may shed insight into this incredible Internet stock
performance. The model is  based not on business
fundamentals, but on the  theory of investor psychology in
the context of electronic commerce.
Conceptual Model of Internet Investor Behavior
     The microfoundations of behavioral finance identifies
among other constructs two psychological regularities:
overconfidence and attribution bias (Daniel et al., 1998).
Debont and Thaler (1995) state that “perhaps the most
robust finding in the psychology of judgement is that
people are overconfident.”
The Case of Investor Overconfidence
     Evidence of overconfidence has been found in several
contexts. Examples include psychologists, physicians and
nurses, engineers, attorneys, negotiators, entrepreneurs,
managers, investment bankers, security analysts and
economic forecasters (Oskamp, 1965; Baumann et al.,
1991; Kidd, 1970; Wagenaar and Keren, 1986; DeBondt
and Thaler, 1990; DeBondt, 1991; Odean 1998, Howe,
1986). Psychological evidence also indicates
overconfidence  is more severe for people in the context of
diffuse tasks, which require judgement, than for mechanical
tasks (solving arithmetic problems); and more severe for
tasks   with delayed feedback as opposed to tasks that
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provide immediate and conclusive outcome feedback
(Einhorn, 1980). Fundamental valuation of stocks
(securities) (forecasting long-term cash flows) requires
judgement about open-ended issues, and feedback is noisy
and deferred. This has implications for overconfidence on
the part of  investors in financial markets (Bernardo and
Welch, 1998). Hence, it is reasonable to argue that
individual investors investing in Internet stocks are
overconfident as they keep on investing with a frenzy that
keeps driving the price of these stocks at a level that cannot
reasonably be explained using business performance
fundamentals.
     Daniel et al. (1998) contend that investors view
themselves as more able to value securities than they
actually are, so they underestimate their forecast error
variance.
     Given that it is difficult to predict or forecast anything
about the future of the Internet either on the technological
end or the business end, it is reasonable to assume that
many Internet stock investors are underestimating their
forecast error variance.  This is consistent with evidence
that people overestimate their own abilities, and perceive
themselves more favorably than they are viewed by others
(Greenwald, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988). Several
experimental studies find that individuals underestimate
their error variance in making predictions, and overweight
their own forecasts relative to those of others (Alpert and
Raiffa, 1982; Yates, 1990).
The Case of Biased Self-Attribution
     The second part focuses on the theory of biased self-
attribution: The confidence of the investor grows when
public information is in agreement with the individual
investor’s information, but it does not fall commensurately
when public information contradicts the investor’s private
information. This implies that as Internet stock investors
obtain rapid public information either over the Internet or
through other media, this public information reinforces the
private information of the investor and his/her expectation
about the ecommerce frontier in general. This leads to
higher confidence on the part of the investor.
     The psychological evidence indicates that people tend to
credit themselves for past success, and blame external
factors for failure (Fischhoff, 1982; Langer and Roth, 1975;
Miller and Ross, 1975). Biased self-attribution leads
investors who acquire wealth through successful investment
to become more overconfident (Gervais and Odean, 1998).
Another offshoot of overconfidence is that it can act like a
commitment to trade more aggressively.  When an investor
receives confirming public information, his/her confidence
rises, but disconfirming information causes confidence to
fall only modestly, if at all.
     Biased self-attribution can be observed in the behavior
of Internet stock investors. As stock price of the Internet
companies increase, it increases the wealth of these stock
holders making them wealthier through (seemingly)
successful investment. This success leads these investors to
become more overconfident. This overconfidence leads
them to trade more aggressively which may lead them to
invest in IPOs of new Internet companies. On the other
hand, disconfirming public news such as weak
fundamentals such as continuing loss incurred by most
Internet companies, negative cash flows, etc. have caused
confidence of these investors to fall only modestly or if at
all.
     Thus if an individual begins with unbiased beliefs about
his ability, new public signals on average  is viewed as
confirming the validity of his private signal. This suggests
that public information can trigger further overreaction to a
preceding private signal. Continuing overreaction causes
momentum in securities prices, but that such momentum is
eventually reversed as further public information gradually
draws the price back toward fundamentals. Thus, biased
self-attribution on the part of the individual investor implies
short-term momentum and long-term reversals.
Ecommerce Consumer Turned Ecommerce
Investor
     In this paper, we focus only on the individual investors
as only a few institutional investors  are beginning  to invest
in the Internet companies. It is safe to assume that a
significant portion of individual investors that have invested
billions of dollars in the stocks of these Internet companies,
over the last few years, have considerable knowledge not
only about the potential of these companies but also about
the potential of the entire electronic commerce frontier.
After all, it is the promise and possibility of electronic
commerce that drives the much anticipated expectation of
the investors in the Internet companies that make up the
Internet Industry. It is also safe to assume that much of the
information used by these individual ecommerce consumers
turned investors are derived and disseminated over the
Internet through various web sites, chat groups, investor
communities focused on Internet stocks. Hence, we observe
a dual reciprocating and reinforcing role of the Internet as
an information medium at least for these individual
investors. It is simultaneously the reason to invest and the
conduit of experience (flow) through which information is
channeled.
Conclusion
     The dual role of the Internet both as the reason to invest
and the conduit for rapid information readily impacts on the
overconfidence and  biased self-attribution of the Internet
investors. This paper has developed  a model, based on the
microfoundation of behavioral finance, to explain the
phenomenal stock performance of the Internet companies.
We have identified that overconfidence and biased self-
attribution reinforces each other and are further positively
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reinforced with confirming public information and fall only
modestly or at all with disconfirming public information.
This is only a theoretical model and has to be empirically
tested. Authors are in the process of developing testable
propositions and experimental designs to test this model of
Internet stock investors.
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